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DELEUZE AND THE MAIDEN: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PORNOLOGY
I. THE VANISHING BEGINNINGS
 Between 1945 and 1947, Gilles Deleuze gave to several prestigious publications 
five texts that together formed the first moment of his work—the moment prior to 
the great silence preceding the appearance of Empiricism and Subjectivity. The texts 
were brilliant and singular and were the reason that, despite his young age, all those 
in the entourage of Marie-Madeleine Davy, his mentor during the Occupation, saw 
in Deleuze a “new Sartre.”1 Later on, however, he chose to pull these texts from his 
bibliography, and he even went as far as to forbid any reproduction or reunion in 
volume, be it even after his death. These texts saw themselves fully excluded from 
the canon of his work—as if Deleuze had wanted to signify that they, too, were part 
of the meditative silence preceding his first veritable work: his first book. These texts 
could hold no status other than that of the scholastic exercise, of the draft having no 
purpose other than to serve as training ground for the progressive development of 
future concepts. When, much later, Deleuze presented his famous definition of 
philosophy—philosophy is “the creation of concepts”2—he was undoubtedly thinking 
back to his own development. It was these five texts that he was hoping to see 
disappear and replaced with a long, unseen stretch that could have constituted the 
“somber precursor” of his own thought; to this end, the existence of his first texts 
was too clear and distinct. The event of the creation of a concept could not be thought 
of as a fiat lux because it was already included in the pleat of the world. However, 
this inclusion was still, and necessarily, in the process of unfolding. On the other 
hand, if this event had a precursor, it had no draft; in the precursor the event’s 
perfection had already to be whole, as the entire content of a rhizome can be found 
in the smallest of its branches. Such, perhaps, was the justification and purpose of 
Deleuze’s renunciation of his first texts: once they had been published, they became 
too real. They were no longer virtual enough.
II. DESCRIPTION OF WOMAN
 Deleuze’s very first text, Description of Woman: For a Philosophy of the Sexed Other, 
which appeared in Poesie 45 in the fall of 1945, could be considered privileged 
evidence in the quest for the reasons that pushed Deleuze to make these youthful 
texts disappear.3 Since the 1943 publication of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness, Deleuze ceaselessly professed his growing admiration for the book, as 
Michel Tournier described in Le Vent Paraclet.4 When he discovered Sartre’s book, 
explains Tournier, Deleuze telephoned him every day so as to include him in the 
enthusiastic observations born as his reading progressed. But, soon after France’s 
Liberation following World War II, when Sartre’s fame increased exponentially, 
Deleuze’s disappointment was commensurate with his erstwhile enthusiasm; Sartre, 
1. Cf. Francois Dosse, Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari: Biographie Croisée 116 (2007).
2. Cf. Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Qu’Est-ce que la Philosophie? passim (1991).
3. Gilles Deleuze, Description de la Femme: Pour une Philosophie d’Autrui Sexuée, 28 Poésie 28–39 (1945). 
4. Michel Tournier, Le Vent Paraclet (1977). 
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after all, was a humanist. In the meantime, Description of Woman had appeared and, 
while it was intended to act as an addendum to the chapters of Being and Nothingness 
relative to desire and sexuality, it was also his way of picking up one of Sartre’s 
reproaches of Heidegger. Sartre had reproached Heidegger’s philosophy for having 
painted only the portrait of an asexual humanity—precisely where, in reality, 
sexuality is the cause of everything. In Description of Woman, Deleuze therefore 
attempts to give “philosophical dignity” to the forgotten figure of woman—a 
“dignity” whose principal traits were formulated according to the terms of Sartrean 
thought. However, even if this was something of a “pastiche” (as François Dosse 
stressed5), Deleuze’s article showed early signs of several obsessions that one would 
find again in his “recognized” works. First and foremost among these was his 
appreciation for surfaces; in women, explained Deleuze, that which counts before all 
else is makeup—that is, the manner by which an artificial surface is given to that 
which would otherwise be nothing more than a blind interiority.
III. THEORIZING MAKEUP
 In the eyes of the young Deleuze, in order to even begin to contemplate woman’s 
fundamental interiority—as opposed to man’s fundamental exteriority—any theory 
concerning woman had to be a theory about makeup. To this end, Deleuze 
differentiated two main cosmetic categories: “surface” makeup (e.g., powders, 
foundation, blush) and “cavity” makeup (e.g., mascara, eyeliner, lipstick).6 If cosmetics 
of the first category, Deleuze explained, allow one to enhance the surface of a 
woman’s face, then only those of the second category could help reveal, by tracing 
the exterior, her fundamental interiority. To outline the eyes or the mouth is to invite 
the viewer to plunge into this interiority, i.e., to challenge his existence. To challenge 
his existence, Deleuze added, is to challenge the existence of the world—“woman is 
a concrete universal, she is a world, not an exterior world, but the underside of the 
world, the tepid interiority of the world, a concentration of the interiorized world. 
Hence the prodigious sexual success of woman: to possess woman is to possess the 
world.”7 Thus, in describing these two types of makeup and in presenting the woman 
in makeup as keeper of the secret of the world’s interiority—a secret only accessible 
by means of cosmetic artifice—Deleuze revealed himself. What he revealed about 
himself was more than that which his future ethic of discretion would be able to 
accept: he revealed the character—more importantly, the cerebral character—of his 
relationship with sexuality and with women. However, he also revealed the instinctual 
truth that feeds all ideas of mask, makeup, cosmetics, or simulacra—a formulated 
truth, this time put in terms too sexed to be admissible. Even before he began 
developing the theory of desire, the cosmic accents of which would bring him fame, 
the real truth of this theory had already been made visible to all: there can be no desire 
other than that of a man for a woman in makeup.
5. Dosse, supra note 1, at 119.
6. Deleuze, supra note 3, at 33–34.
7. Id. at 32.
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IV. THE GIRL’S ENTRANCE
 In Deleuze’s subsequent work, his fascination with the figure of woman would 
take a more discreet and more complicated turn, and, henceforth, the woman of 
Description would no longer make any explicit appearance. In the meantime, as 
Catherine Clement noted (and who remains the only person to have done so), another 
character would progressively take on a more considerable role in his work: the girl.8 
From Deleuze’s Coldness and Cruelty9 to his Kafka, from Proust and Signs10 to The 
Logic of Sense,11 girls proliferate in Deleuze’s work as so many anamorphoses of the 
forgotten woman.12 If, from this point on, neither makeup nor interiority is the main 
concern, the girl, then, occupies a strange place within his system: that of the 
perturbing other. The girl is the element whose presence spells the impossibility that an 
order, whatever its form, is able to enjoy the comfort of its own enclosure—an order 
where, most often, the actors are fathers and mothers. In Deleuze’s vocabulary, one 
would say that girls represent numerous “lines of flight” through which that which 
claims to be contained at the interior of an order actually ends up revealing the 
insoluble dimension of this same claim. The most striking example of this is the role 
that sisters, maids, and prostitutes (three different forms of the girl) play at the core of 
Kafka’s work, as Deleuze and Guattari suggested in their Kafka.13 The machinery of 
the law, in which the protagonists of Kafka’s work are constantly implicated, reveals 
vacuoles that manage to except themselves from it. These are vacuoles—frenetic gaps 
within the machinery of the law—where the law is turned upside-down and where it 
has no power. The derangement that girls produce in Kafka’s characters is the same 
derangement produced by Lewis Carroll’s Alice in the Queen of Hearts’s croquet 
game14 and that is produced by the groups of adolescents in In Search of Lost Time’s 
obsessive narrator. In all of these situations, a state of regulated things is confronted 
by a reality that is stronger than its will to maintain regulation: the reality of desire.
V. THE DIVIDED WORLD OF WOMEN
 When he moved from woman to girl, Deleuze initially did nothing more than pass 
from the concrete reality of this desire (“to possess woman is to possess the world”) to 
a more abstract, thus more euphemized, reality. Desire—instinctive and born of a 
8. Cf. C. Clément, Les Petites Filles ou les Aventures de la Philosophie, Gilles Deleuze, Paris, 
Inculte, 2005, p. 17 et seq. (republication that became a special issue of L’Arc, n° 49, 1972, dedicated to 
Deleuze) (on file with author).
9. Gilles Deleuze, Présentation de Sacher-Masoch: Le Froid et le Cruel (1967) (on file with 
author).
10. Gilles Deleuze, Proust et les Signes (1964).
11. Gilles Deleuze, Logique du Sens (1969).
12. See Laurent de Sutter, Deleuze: La pratique du droit 59–60 (2009). 
13. Cf. Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Kafka: Pour une Littérature Mineure 113–19 (1975).
14. See generally Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 112–29 (Boston, Lee & Shepard 
1869) (1865) (narrating when Alice disrupts the Queen’s croquet match and is almost beheaded).
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positive idea of woman—became the pure concept of a negative idea of this same 
woman, while the girl, in opposition with the mother, became the woman wearing 
makeup. While, as a positive idea, the woman grants access to the interiority of the 
world, as a negative idea, she does not grant men the satisfaction of a definitive 
installation in the order of exteriority that is constitutive of man. This movement from 
the concrete to the abstract, or from the positive to the negative, did not come without 
a price: henceforth, the world of women would be divided into two unequal parts. 
With the presence of the figure of the girl, access to the interiority of the world—or 
the disconcertion of the installation in a pure exteriority—was no longer a possibility 
open to all women. Only girls, as women wearing makeup, could claim to offer this 
access, while other women, those not wearing makeup, found themselves confined in 
the same exteriority as men—or, more accurately, found themselves deprived of their 
constitutive interiority in such a way that their presence in the world of exteriority 
suddenly had no value other than that of a ghost or specter. Similarly, for the young 
Deleuze, makeup was the source of desire aroused by the experience of the interiority 
offered by women, while, for the mature Deleuze, this source was found only within 
girls. Thus, a kind of disequilibrium was introduced into women as a group: the power 
to offer the experience of interiority was reserved for a minority, but this experience, 
too, was affected by disequilibrium. Indeed, the experience of interiority no longer 
brought about reconciliation with the world; it had become a perturbation.
VI. DISORDER AND TECHNÈ
 Despite the fact that, as stated above, the figure of the girl is recurring, Deleuze 
never described in a systematic manner the perturbation of the world’s order that this 
figure introduces. The revolutionary force inherent in the desire aroused by the girl 
was, to him, a precise enough explanatory factor that further development was 
unnecessary. The question posed by the figure of the girl, for Deleuze, could be 
answered by the desire that she provoked, i.e. in the Spinozism of the event that, 
today, one still attaches to his name. However, the singular relationship in his work 
involving the girl and desire merited further inquiry. Deleuze should have asked the 
question that, according to him, was the most important: “How?” In other words, 
how does the girl manage to perturb, through the desire that she arouses, the world’s 
order—how does she create a “line of f light” interior its exteriority? That what 
Deleuze called a “conceptual personae” be attached in a privileged manner to desire 
signaled, in effect, that implicated here was something fitting of a drama. Desire 
concerns not only the event and becoming—it concerns the machination of the event 
and of becoming; it concerns their construction or creation: “How does one perturb 
order?” “How does one create disorder?” Such was the nature of the question posed 
by the figure of the girl in Deleuze’s work—a question to which the concept of desire, 
as such, could provide no answer. In order to begin answering this question, one 
would have to reread Description of Woman—that is, Deleuze needed to reconcile 
with his own Sartrean past, indeed, with his own desires. The answer, then, would 
have appeared clear as day. To create disorder, a very simple act suffices, and, as it is 
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very simple, it is impossible to elude: she simply needs to pull out her tube of lipstick. 
Cosmetics are, themselves, the techné of disorder.
VII. THE PORNO ORDER OF LAW
 Perhaps it was necessary to give an example of the cosmetics of the event for which 
Deleuze, owing to his strange obsession for girls, became nolens volens, the silent 
advocate. In Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari made considerable efforts to establish the 
validity of the following theorem, one that could have seemed a little extravagant: 
the theorem that the law is written “on a porno book.”15 In their eyes, this theorem 
had first to be considered as the enouncement of the reality, which the theorem 
claimed provided the following description: the judges’ library in The Trial16 
contained only obscene works. However, beyond this description, the theorem 
suggested that the reality thus described was also reality on another level: the level 
that one could permissibly call “critique”—if the term were restituted, as it was by 
Deleuze, to its specific usage. To say “the law is written on a book of porno” is to 
underline that Kafka’s work, in staging judges as readers of obscene works, meant to 
suggest something about the law itself. In other words, the fact is that the books 
consulted by the judges during their audiences were works divorced not from their 
function, but, on the contrary, from that which to them was the most fitting. If the 
works the judges read could be said to constitute, together, a gigantic “porno book,” 
it is precisely because they are books of law—or, more accurately: the book of the law. 
Yet, since the obscene episodes described in these books were reminiscent of those 
occurring in corridors of the Hall of Justice, an ambiguity appeared in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theorem. What was the difference between the depictions appearing in 
the book of the law and the moments of derangement that Joseph K. experienced in 
the company of maids, of girls, and of prostitutes? What was the difference between 
the porno order of the law and the disorder—or perturbation—that, according to the 
hypothesis formed elsewhere by Deleuze, girls supposedly herald? Could this be due 
to the fact that the first case is solely concerned with images?
VIII. FANTASIES AS REALITIES
 That an image is described as “porno”—or, in a broader sense, that it could give 
rise to desire—also counts among the possibilities left aside by Deleuze until he wrote 
his books on cinema. It is barely, if at all, that Deleuze, in a 1985 interview subsequent 
to the publication of Cinema 2: The Time-Image, allowed himself to bring attention to 
the lobotomized character of “the majority of cinematographic production, with its 
arbitrary violence and its mindless eroticism.”17 Again, eroticism—as a category of the 
explanation of the desire animating the images—was grafted onto the cerebral and 
onto that of the image disconnected from any and all things imaginary. Moreover, at 
15. Deleuze & Guattari, supra note 13, at 90.
16. Franz Kafka, The Trial 21 (David Wyllie trans., Project Gutenberg eBook 10th ed. 2005) (1925).
17. Gilles Deleuze, Sur l ’Image-Temps, in Pourparlers 86 (1990).
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around the same time, in the answers Deleuze gave to a questionnaire from a cinema 
magazine, he did not hesitate to admit that he “did not attach much importance to the 
notion of the imaginary.”18 Thus, it is easy to understand why the great absentee in 
Deleuze’s philosophy of image is the notion of fantasy that Lacanian psychoanalysis 
had attached to that of the imaginary. In his thought, there is no fantasy; there are 
only realities whose modalities, while variable, nevertheless embody the general 
character of these realities. However, because his philosophy is of an absolute realism, 
Deleuze’s thought is obstructed by the figure of the girl who appears incessantly in his 
work and who arouses the fantasies of those who encounter her, starting with Deleuze 
himself. One can certainly speak of a “mindless eroticism” in the case of the 
pornographic images in which Kafka’s judges delight, but what about the tricks 
turned by prostitutes? Were they not “images” and thus “realities” able to claim a type 
of dignity equivalent to that of other images, be they “porno” or not? On this point, 
Deleuze was never clear. His taste for the cerebral prevented him from perceiving that 
fantasy, as all things, could be called real.
IX. LAW’S DERANGEMENT
 If, as Deleuze and Guattari hypothesized, a “porno book” is the cornerstone of 
the order of the law, then it must also be the cornerstone of disorder—put differently, 
porn is the milieu of the law. In the milieu of the law, porn is that which ordains 
disorder: porn is the operation by which the law reveals its fantasized power and, 
through this fantasy, its true impotence. In this sense, it is possible to maintain that 
the cosmetics of the event—whose terms were laid out in Description of Woman—
were certainly a realism of fantasy. The concrete fantasy that is aroused by the 
presence of the girl is the operator that introduces in the law an outside interior by 
which the comfort of “exteriority” is quickly destroyed—or, more accurately, 
deranged. If this operator of disorder is in fact cerebral, it is cerebral in the same way 
that “mindless eroticism” is “lobotomized”—and, in turn, the same way that the 
“imaginary” is constituted by the fantasy galvanizing the operator. When they wrote 
that “the law is written on a porno book,” Deleuze and Guattari were suggesting, 
despite themselves, that the law was much more than a book: it was an image. 
Moreover, it was not only one image, but a film. This film of fantasies aroused by 
girls is the medium through which the operation resulting in the complete 
derangement of the order of the law extends and acts as that which makes possible 
this same order. The reality of the order of the law is the same reality of the pornographic 
fantasies aroused by girls—that is, by women in makeup, as makeup is that which gives 
body to the fantasy of interiority. We can thus summarize all ambiguity of the role 
played by the girl in Deleuze’s thought by saying that she is the incarnation of the 
desire that gives rise to the event, as incarnation of fantasies that give rise to disorder. 
But this ambiguity goes beyond her own reality; this ambiguity is somehow able to 
contaminate all images.
18. Gilles Deleuze, Doutes sur l ’Imaginaire, in Pourparlers 94 (1990). 
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X. THE SUBJECT STRIKES BACK
 Like all of the philosophers of his generation, Deleuze interminably claimed that 
he dismissed the subject of a specific and contemporary tendency of thought; but just 
when he thought tendency departed, he, like his contemporaries, kept seeing it 
reappear in his work.19 In Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema, though the phenomenon 
is subtler than it is elsewhere, the outcome is the same: the ghostly return of the 
spectator. When Jacques Rancière claimed that Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema was a 
philosophy of nothing other than itself (and thus certainly not of cinema), he, too, 
misunderstood this ghostly return.20 In claiming to establish a “natural history” of 
cinema, in which different branches would designate different types of images, 
Deleuze’s explicit agenda was to reinvent the concept of time. But the fact that this 
reinvention was written within the framework of a history of cinema could lead one 
to think that only a film (and, then, only a “great” film) was capable of delivering 
experience. Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema, in this sense, was much closer to 
phenomenology than were any of his other works—given that in his philosophy he 
was proposing an aesthetic of the reception of time. Cinema’s images, as media princeps 
of the different forms of time, were unthinkable without at least a spectator capable 
of using them to draw up the exhaustive catalogue—a spectator like Deleuze himself, 
or, for that matter, anybody. One understands better, then, why the “mindless 
eroticism” about which he spoke in his interview on The Time-Image did not have, in 
the catalogue, a positive counterpart. For Deleuze, eroticism was always “mindless” 
in that he would substitute the pure cerebral nature of thought, vis-à-vis time, with 
another cerebral nature. Here, the cerebral nature would be impure: the fantastic 
experience of images. Given that, on one hand, eroticism was always “mindless,” and 
that, on the other, all experience was that of a subject tormented by fantasies, the 
conclusion was self-evident: all experience is mindless—thus erotic.
XI. DISMISSING THE EXPERIENCE OF IMAGES
 It was necessary for Deleuze to relinquish his role as cinematic spectator in order 
to describe images as pure forms of the concept of time and to forget the fantasies 
that he had, in the first place, excluded. He needed to dismiss the experience of 
images and, through this, the singular erotic experience of the spectator, so as to 
relocate the girls in a film to a place where they would no longer pose a threat. For, 
when he claimed to implement a system of time through the examination of the 
different forms of images able to be adopted by the same system, he was actually 
trying to avoid danger. This danger was the reappearance of Description of Woman 
and, therefore, that of the “humanism” that he and Tournier had, at one time, 
reproached in their predecessor, Sartre. Like Sartre, Deleuze failed to leave humanism 
19. See generally Slavoj Zizek, Le Sujet Qui Fâche: Le Centre Absent de l’Ontologie Politique 
(Stathis Kouvélakis trans., 2007).
20. Cf. Jacques Rancière, L’affect indécis: Propos recueillis par Patrice Blouin, Elie During et Dork Zabunyan, 
692–93, Revue Critique 142–43 (2005) (on file with author). Alain Badiou also made the same error. 
See Alain Badiou, Deleuze: La Clameur de l’Être 27 (1997).
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behind—simply because he, like Sartre, continued to desire in the most banal and 
least Spinozian mode possible. In rereading Description of Woman and in comparing 
it with the figures of girls appearing elsewhere in his work, one realizes that the 
praise of makeup was in fact a praise of images. Precisely, it was a praise of girls as 
images—that is, the girls that one finds in magazines and to whom makeup gives a 
remarkable reality. The catalogue of the different types of images—the drawing up 
of which Deleuze dedicated himself to in his books about cinema—was the cerebral 
form taken by the catalogue of the different types of girls. When he was describing 
these different types of girls as a source of derangement within the order of the law, 
it was thus necessary to understand that girls were, above all, a source of derangement 
for him and, notably, for the philosophic order that he was trying to establish. Girls 
were the persistent sign of the cerebral fantasy that pushed him to find in the concept 
a world where the strength of desire could finally be expressed in full freedom.
XII. PORTRAIT OF THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER AS A YOUNG GIRL
 With Description of Woman as the hidden key to the relationship that Deleuze 
maintained with women and with images, it became possible to comprehend the extent 
to which it was necessary to renounce this work. In truth, the renunciation came with 
a drastic consequence: with it went the possibility of an “outside” to philosophy—a 
place in the world where the concept would not be the only admissible entity. In the 
same way that girls appear only as contraband in Deleuze’s work, this “outside” returned 
from time to time in the most unexpected form. This form was that of legal practice. 
Be it in his interviews with Claire Parnet, in A Thousand Plateaus,21 or in Coldness and 
Cruelty, the practice of law, according to Deleuze, shared with girls a spectral status. 
The reason for this shared status was clear though, undoubtedly, unexpected: girls and 
the practice of law are, in reality, one and the same. In the same way as girls, legal practice, 
in Deleuze’s writing, intervenes only to disturb the comfortable order of the law, the 
same order of which philosophy claimed to be herald. The practice of law is the arena 
in which the law—the system of rules that claim to uphold order—fails to enclose its 
own exteriority. It is the arena where the “internal outside” of the law appears, the 
exteriority of its exteriority, the practice of its concepts. The law—a legacy of the Greek 
philosophy of nomos—is that which law’s practice—a legacy of the Roman practice of 
ius, continuously deranges by demonstrating the impossibility of the former’s claims, 
whatever they may be.22 In Coldness and Cruelty, this opposition was clear: the “images 
of the law,” having been conceived throughout the history of philosophy (Plato or 
Kant), were always in symmetric opposition to the critiques of these same images.23 
But these critiques were themselves only the first moment of a much more radical 
derangement within the system of the law: a purely negative moment followed by a 
positive moment. The negative moment was that of the philosophical critique—the 
positive, that of the legal clinic.
21. Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Mille Plateaux (Minuit 1980).
22. On the reconstruction of this thesis, see de Sutter, supra note 12, at 104–05.
23. Cf. Deleuze, supra note 9, at 71.
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XIII. PHILOSOPHY’S SELF-DESTRUCTION
 Such, perhaps, was the source of Deleuze’s uneasiness: philosophy, because it 
continued to dismiss the possibility of an outside of concept (an outside of the cerebral), 
remained grafted to a juridical thought. Girls who derange—through the fantasies 
that they arouse—the cerebral order of desire had to be rejected by juridical thought 
in the same way that the practice of law had to be presented as antagonistic to 
philosophy. But, since Deleuze’s philosophical endeavor aimed precisely to reintroduce 
into the order of philosophy this outside that had previously been excluded, he needed 
girls just as he needed legal practice. He needed them for structural reasons—to 
establish the possibility of an outside of philosophy—as much as for personal reasons—
to restore the presence of his fantasy (that which was unmentionable). That he never 
wished to justify these reasons and that he prohibited any future publication of the 
text that would allow one to uncover these reasons are two of the most awkward 
theoretical moves of the past half-century. To give girls and the practice of law a 
philosophical dignity, as antagonists of philosophy, could only have been a foreseeable 
possibility had Deleuze accepted the reality of fantasies and the necessity of the 
spectator. However, since he had decided, due to historical context, to follow the 
contemporary critical movement of the imaginary and of the subject, he foreclosed the 
possibility. Retrospectively, the true radicalism of his thought resided not in this 
satisfecit given to the requirements of his time, but in the proclamation of philosophy’s 
self-destruction. Self-destruction was placed at the heart of his thinking, like a 
landmine waiting to be detonated—waiting because Deleuze, after having placed it, 
had preferred to pull out of the danger zone. Or, at least, he pretended to try—an 
attempt that could very well have been just another one of his tricks.
XIV. PORNOLOGY = GIRLS + IMAGES + THE PRACTICE OF LAW
 Despite his rejection of “mindless eroticism,” there is one of Deleuze’s words that 
must be remembered: we need, he explained in Coldness and Cruelty, a new 
“pornology.”24 This word, which occurs only once (in Coldness and Cruelty), is not the 
object of a specific development, and, if nothing else, is used in order to point to the 
application of a pornographic logic to philosophy. Like the concept of “simulacra” in 
The Logic of Sense or in Difference and Repetition,25 this was also a kind of theoretical 
hapax that was abandoned the moment it appeared, before any decisive installation 
could be made. Again, perhaps one must see in this almost immediate denial the 
trace of a temptation that was existentially irresistible, but one that philosophy’s 
exigencies are inclined to reject. However, as with girls and the practice of law 
(simulacra or, shall we say, images), this temptation seems to involve more than a 
simple intuition; it lays out a veritable system. For Alain Badiou, all of Deleuze’s 
philosophy needed to be considered a system, in the same way one considers Classical 
French Philosophy, namely that of Descartes or Malebranche, to be a system of its 
24. Id. at 18.
25. Gilles Deleuze, Différence et Répétition (1968).
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own.26 If this is true, then one must not forget to add that Deleuze’s philosophical 
system is coupled with a drop shadow: a counter-system continuously coming to 
parasitize the perfection of the first system. Girls, the practice of law, and images 
form the main parts of this counter-system—a counter-system whose name it would 
not be far-fetched to suppose is, precisely, “pornology.” Pornology is the antiphilosophic 
move by which philosophy gives itself its own outside, while at the same time doing 
all in its power to ensure that this outside will be declared impossible. Thus, the 
following equation—pornology = girls + images + practice of law—is an 
antiphilosophic and explosive equation with which, though Deleuze refused to 
explicitly use it, he went about undermining his texts. Deleuze two-timed himself.
XV. THE THREE THEOREMS OF LEGAL PORNOLOGY
 It would require numerous efforts to fully reconstruct Deleuze’s antiphilosophic 
system—and to do it the justice that Deleuze denied it. In guise of introduction, 
perhaps, one could remember only the most important of the enounced while waiting 
for a more rigorous coherence, somewhere, someday. The enounced are numbered at 
three and form three theorems capable of both demonstration and illustration: the 
theorem of girl, the theorem of image, and the theorem of the practice of law. The 
theorem of girls would be: all order gives rise to its own disorder in the attempt to foreclose 
its possibility—the foreclosure of the possibility of disorder creates disorder. Then, 
the theorem of image: all reality gives rise to its own limitlessness in the attempt to exclude 
its opposite—it is the refusal of fantasies that makes them a reality. Finally, the 
theorem of the practice of law: law—as a system of rules—gives rise to its own annulment 
in the attempt to control practice—it is the avowal of the supremacy of the law that 
annuls all possibility of the law. If it is difficult to articulate these three theorems in 
a manner other than their equivalence—where girls, the practice of law, and images 
would be one and the same—one may always try. Thus, let us propose this: the girl, 
being that which arouses in the law fantasies (images) that perturb the cerebral 
regularity of its desire, is the conceptual persona of which law is the practice. As an 
aphorism: the practice of law is the cosmetics of disorder, and thus the vibration of 
life introduced into the interior of the abstract order of the law. Undoubtedly, this 
lesson will be found to be deceiving. Undoubtedly, to transform the practice of law 
into the incarnation of life will be considered a very narrow (because it is libidinal) 
understanding of the latter. It is possible, however, given that a broad understanding 
of life has consistently contributed to juridical thought, it is only this narrow type of 
understanding that, from now on, will be able to turn us on.
26. Cf. Badiou, supra note 20, at 29.
